This paper provides a review on China's meat trade for the 2000-2012 period and discusses its future development, with reference to China's grain trade. With marginal decreases in meat exports and slight increases in their imports, China's net imports of major meat products (including pork, beef, mutton and poultry but excluding meat offal) were just below one million tons in 2012, dwarfed by China's net imports of grains which reached 66.7 million tons in the same year. This slow growth in meat trade seems to contradict earlier expectations on increasing meat demand and imports, based upon projected shifts in consumption patterns driven by rapid per capita income growth. Several plausible explanations of this paradoxical trade pattern are offered, including mass imports of feed grains, persistent (but shrinking) gaps between Chinese and international meat prices, tariff barriers, and non-tariff measures. In the near future China may not be able to maintain such a lower profile on the world meat markets, as per capita income is projected to continue to rise and domestic production cost advantages erode due to rising labor costs. A model-based projection exercise indicates that under plausible assumptions China's meat imports may rise sharply by 2030.
Introduction
Recent international and domestic discussions on China's food security situation and its impact on the world food markets seem to be squarely on the four major grains (rice, wheat, maize, and soybean). These discussions have only intensified following recent world grain price spikes (Yang et al. 2008 , Nelson 2011 , Hansen et al. 2009 , Liu et al. 2013 and Yu and Jensen 2014 , to just name a few). Within China, it has been emphasized time and again that maintaining a high level of food grain self-sufficiency is of vital importance to the stability of China's domestic markets and the national economy. Such self-sufficiency often refers to that of rice, wheat and maize. Internationally, both major importing and exporting countries closely follow the development of China's trade positions in these products, with the former (especially the poor ones) worrying about rising Chinese imports driving up world market prices and the latter pushing hard for further opening of the Chinese market. Major international organizations and national agencies in foreign countries regularly publish studies on China's future grain demand and supply (see e.g. OECD 2013, OECD-FAO 2014, FAPRI-ISU and USDA), as have been done by individual researchers (e.g. Fan et al. 1997 , Fuller 1997 , Chen et al. 2004 , Michiel and Wim 2011 , Zhong et al. 2012 , Zhou et al. 2014 .
What is surprising in these discussions is the lack of equally intensive debates on China's import demand for meat products, an area in which China has long been projected to drastically increase its demand due to rapidly rising per capita income and higher income elasticities of demand for these products (see e.g. Coyle et al. 1998 , Cranfield et al. 1998 , Yu et al. 2004 and references contained therein).
1 Rapid urbanization in China is also expected to increase consumptions of animal products even when price and income effects are controlled for (Rae 1998). Indeed, as the average consumers in China have become more affluent, changes in their food basket towards more meats and dairy products have been observed (see e.g. Ma et al. 2004b ). However, rising demand of meats in China has so far largely been met with domestic production rather than from imports, a situation that greatly contrasts that for grains. This situation was noted in a few earlier studies (Rae 2008 , Rae and Zhang 2009 , and Gale and Huang 2009 ) and has remained the case in the more recent years. According to official trade statistics from the UN COMTRADE database (as reported in Tables 1 and 2 ), China's imports of the four major meat products (pork, beef, mutton, and poultry) increased from just over 1 million tons in 2000 to 1.23 million tons in 2012, for an average annualized growth of 1.6%. 2 In contrast, during the same period, China's imports of the four major grains rose from 11.5 million tons to 67.6 million tons, for an annualized increase of 16% which is ten times of the annual growth of meat imports.
What accounts for these drastically different changing trade volumes and patterns for meats and grains? Based on an overview on China's meat trade in the 2000-2012 period, in comparison to its grain trade, one of the objectives of this paper is to offer some possible reasons to explain why China's meat trade has remained at such low levels. Certainly, a simple application of the widely accepted regular linkage between rising per capita income and rising meat demand would not be sufficient to explain this paradoxical development. Analytical attentions must be paid to: a. China's apparent capacities in producing meat products domestically; b. linkages between domestic meat production and imports of feed grains especially maize and soybean; c. relative domestic-international price differentials across meats and grains; and d. possibly differential trade barriers. In this paper, we focus on the last three points as possible reasons to explain the observed trade patterns in the recent past while referring readers to the relevant literature on the first point.
Will the observed trend on China's meat trade in the recent past continue in the next two decades? Seeking to provide some insights into this question comprises of the second objective of this study. Judging from the already large market shares of China on the world maize and soybean markets, it seems that future potentials in relying on increased imported feed grains for domestic meat production may be constrained at some point in the future. Moreover, rising costs including labor cost will also push meat production costs ever closer to or even exceeding benchmark international prices. 3 These cost side considerations, coupled with continuously rising demand due to rising income and urbanization, will likely lead to a substantial amount of meat imports. To formalize these considerations, we use a well-known computable general equilibrium model to project China's meat trade to 2030.
The rest of the papers are organized as follows. In Section 2, we document the development of China's meat trade for the 2000-2012 period. This is followed by a comparison of China's meat and grain trade in section 3, where we also discuss how large amount of feed grain imports helped China to keep meat imports at low levels. In section 4, additional explanatory factors are gathered to further explain the slow growth of China's meat imports. Section 5 reports a set of model-based projections on China's meat production and trade in 2030. These projections suggest that China's current meat trade pattern is unlikely to continue in the next two decades. The last section concludes with discussions.
2 Imports of edible meat offal, however, increased more in the same period. When these are included, China's total meat and edible meat offal imports rose from 1.15 million tons to 2.08 million tons during the 2000-2012 period. In this paper, we mainly focus on meat imports. 3 Rising labor costs in China have been discussed extensively in the literature. For example, based on village survey data, Zhang et al. (20011) suggest that rural real wages in China have been on continuous rise since 2003 and that the era of surplus labor in China is now over.
China's meat trade pattern: 2000-2012
Due to data availabilities (especially price data), we choose to focus on the period of [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] Table 3 ). For beef and mutton, it rose from 3.3% and 1.7% in 2000 to 5.7% and 3.1% respectively. And for poultry, import share of domestic supply actually decreased from 14.8% to 11.1% in the same period. Based on this evidence, it appears that meat imports have played a quite minor role in the Chinese markets. The only area where imported meats made some inroads into China seems to be limited to poultry meats (and edible meat offal).
Despite the fact that China only imported relatively small amounts of meats, China generally maintained its position as a net importer in terms of total meat import quantities in the 2000-2012 period, largely due to the even smaller amount of exports it managed in that period. One direct reason for China to be able to maintain a very low profile on the world meat markets (other than meat offal) appears to be its ability to maintain steady increase in domestic meat supply. This is evidenced by the continued rise of domestic supply (Table 3 ) of all four meat products. 4 For pork, beef, and poultry, where domestic supply maintained an annual growth rate of 2.6 to 2.8 percent, their domestic outputs more or less retained constant shares of the respective total domestic supply, reflecting the fact that domestic outputs were also on generally continuous rise. In what follows in the rest of the paper, we explore various aspects that may explain China's low export profile and its ability to maintain domestic selfsufficiency.
Comparing China's meat and grain trade
To further illustrate the seemingly low meat exports into China, this section provide a comparison between China's trade in meats and grains. This comparison also offers one key explanation on why China imported so little meats, based on the observation that large quantities of grain imports especially maize and soybean and soy based products were used as feed for China's domestic meat production.
According to Table 2 , China's grain trade in the 2000-2012 period is a tale of two opposite trends. On the import side, continuous and rather large annual surges of imports are observed. In 2000, China imported more than 11.5 million tons of grains for an import value of more than US$2.5 billion. By 2012, these imports reached 67.6 million tons for a staggering value of US$38.9 billion. These changes represent 16% and 26% average annual increases in quantity and value terms, respectively. In contrast, China's grain exports dropped from the peak of 21.5 million tons in 2003 to less than 1 million tons in 2012. Compared to the initial exports in 2000 of 13.6 million tons, the amount of 0.86 million tons of exports in 2012 implies a 21% annualized reduction. In value terms, despite the general rise of nominal prices of grains on the world market, especially the most recent grain price spikes, values of grain exports dropped to US$ 652 million in 2012.
As a result of rising imports and shrinking exports of grains, China became a large net grain import in 2004. By 2012, its net grain imports reached 66.7 million tons. In value terms, China was already a net import in 2000 and its trade deficit in grains mushroomed to US$38.2 billion.
Soybean imports and maize exports have been the major drivers of China's grain trade. On the import side, soybean and soy based products had been the main imports before 2009 and had claimed almost all the grain import shares except for 2004 and 2005 (when China had significant wheat imports). By 2012, China imported more than 58 million tons of soybean products which were more than half of total world exports and nearly four times of China's domestic production for that year (see Table 4 In terms of domestic consumption and use (see Table 4 ), both rice and wheat imports played minor roles in China's domestic supply, with the former contributing to less than 1 percent of domestic supply in most years and the latter adding to mostly 2 to 2.5 percent pf domestic supply. Shares of maize imports in China's domestic maize supply are generally higher with shares between 3 and 4 percent. In the case of soybean, imports have a dominant share in domestic supply, starting at about 47% in 2000 and peaked at nearly 85% in 2010.
While the above analysis certainly paints a starkly difference picture on China's grain imports, especially those of soybean and maize, as compared to the meager meat imports (excluding meat offal) in the same period, it also offers a first explanation on why China imported so little meats in that period. This explanation relies on the obvious role of soybean, soy based products, and maize as feed to livestock and meat production in China (see e.g. Chen et al. 2009 for linkages between China's food demand and soybean imports). To reveal this point, Table 4 presents the utilization of the four grains across food, feed and processing. The relatively less imported rice and wheat are mainly used for food consumptions in China with food consumption shares generally being above 80% and feed shares being below 10% in most of the years. Clearly, these two grains have long been the main food staples in China and have been emphasized in China's agricultural policy framework as food grains. For maize, the food-feed split is the opposite with between two-thirds and three-quarters of total supply are used as feed and less than 7% as food. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that most of the maize imports have been used as feed. In the case of soybean and soy based products, the food share dropped from 20% in 2000 to about 8% in 2012, whereas the direct feed share rose from 7.4% in 2000 to the peak of 13.3% in 2010. But this increase in direct feed use is hardly the whole story because the bulk of soybean supply in China -up to 80% -were used for processing in recent years. The processing of soybean for vegetable oil also produces residuals used as feedstuff. So the total feed use of soybean supply and imports should be far larger than what is indicated in Table 4 .
Based on the above analysis, it is quite apparent that China has fully opened up its import markets for maize and especially soybean but maintained high level self-sufficiency targets (and outcomes) of rice and wheat through trade and domestic policy measures (See e.g. Hansen et al. 2009, and Yu and Jensen 2014 ). An important reason underlying this decision is related to the feed demand from China's livestock and meat sectors. The massive imports of soybean and maize have helped China to maintain high level self-sufficiency of meat products, as these products are used as key feed grains. Of course, while vital to keep China's increasing meat demand towards domestically produced meats, increased imports of soybean and maize is not the only reason behind China's low level of meat imports. The next section discusses other possible reasons.
What else accounts for the slow growth of China's meat imports?
Aside from the massive imports of feed grains into China, possible other reasons include: persistent price differentials between imported and domestic produced meat products, tariff barriers, and non-tariff measures (NTM).
In Tables 5 and 6 , average producer's prices of meat and grain products are listed and compared with their respective benchmark world market prices for the period of 2004-2012. 5 China's domestic producer prices for maize and soybean had been consistently higher than the relevant international benchmark prices. The lone exception is the year of 2008, when world grain market experienced dramatic price spikes. Even in that year, Chinese prices for these products were comparable to the respective benchmark world market prices. It should be noted that since China has been a large trader on the world soybean and maize markets, it would be reasonable to assume that world maize and soybean prices are correlated to China's import demand. Similarly, China's wheat price also exceeded that on the world market, except for the 2007-08 period when insulation trade policy measures were applied by the Chinese government (see Yu and Jensen 2014) . In the case of rice, domestic prices were consistently lower; but this is consistent with the fact that China has been a smaller net exporter of rice with modest gross imports of rice.
As compared to the grain price differentials, China's production cost and producer prices of pork, meat and mutton were consistently lower than the benchmark world market prices. However, a generally shrinking gap between these prices can also be observed. For instance, the domestic/world market price ratio for pork rose from 52% to 100% in 2011 before levelling off to 89% in 2012. The same ratio for beef started at 36% but increased to 93% in 2012. China's mutton price appears to be much lower as compared to the relevant world market price, with the domestic/world market price ratio being 19% in 2004 but rising to 70% by 2012. The lone exception is related to poultry price, where China's production cost and producer's price had been consistently and significantly higher. As shown in Table 5 , China's producer price exceeded the relevant world benchmark price by as much as 55% in recent years. Faster increases in domestic prices in China can also be visually glanced from Figure 1 , where Chinese producer prices for all four meats outpaced the respective world benchmark prices for selected years in the period. In comparison, domestic and world market grain price indices are much more comparable, as can be seen in Figure 2 .
Overall, these price comparisons provide a direct explanation on the observed low level of meat imports, on the overall differences between grain and meat imports, and on the different import patterns within meat products and grain products. However, as the price gaps continue to shrink, it is not surprising to see that (net) imports of pork, beef and mutton have been on the rise in recent years. It is also reasonable to expect a reversal of these price gaps towards more expensive domestic prices in China. In that case, meat imports may increase significantly. A forward looking projection exercise is provided in the next section to explore this possibility.
In addition to the observed price gaps (which reflects production cost differentials and exchange rate movements), tariff and non-tariff measures may have also played a role in restricting meat imports into China. As part of its WTO accession agreement, China agreed to reductions of its MFN (Most Favored Nation) tariffs and the staging of these tariff reduction commitments. In the case of wheat, rice and maize, tariff rate quotas were also established, allowing for near-zero in-quota tariffs for these products (Table 7) . In 2011, average MFN tariff rates of the four meat products were between 15 and 20 percent, as compared to the higher general duty rate for non-WTO members who do not have access to any preferential treatment. These MFN tariff rates for meat products are significantly lower than the MFN tariff rates (i.e. out-quota rates) for the grain products except soybean. However, since China's imports of wheat, rice, and maize were generally lower than import quotas assigned to these products (i.e. these quotas were not binding), the applied tariff rates were actually 1 percent, obviously significantly lower than the applied tariffs for the meat products. These differences in applied tariffs in meat and grain products likely also contributed to the relatively smaller imports of meat products into China, as the generally higher applied meat tariff rates augmented the gaps between world and domestic prices.
In terms of non-tariff measures, China's grain trade have mainly handled by China's state trading enterprises but certain import shares have also been allocated to non-STEs according to China's WTO accession agreement. On the imports of meat products, a system of "automatic import licenses" has been put into place covering most meat products (WTO 2014 , MOFCOM 2014 Judging from the instances of the NTMs used, it does not appear to be the case that China has actively been pursuing NTMs for restricting meat imports after it became a WTO member. The automatic license system also appears to be a monitoring and statistical measure, rather than a trade restrictive measure. Of course, more research should be conducted to understand the effects of these measures. However, if the gaps between domestic and world market prices for meat products continue to shrink or even reverse in the near future, whether or not, to what extent, and for what purposes these NTMs will be applied in meat imports will become interesting questions to ask in the near future.
In summary, in addition to the strategy of mass importing feed grains, another major reason for China to maintain very low level of meat imports appears to be the relative cost advantages manifested in the relatively lower domestic producer prices. However, the relatively lower domestic meat prices have been eroded considerably due to rising costs and exchanges rate adjustment in recent years. Trade barriers, especially import tariffs, augment the gaps between domestic market prices of domestically produced and import meats, thereby plausibly contributing to the lower level of meat imports. NTMs, on the other hand, does not seem to have caused similar effects, as they are relatively few and have been kept stable since China's WTO accession.
Projecting China's meat trade to 2030
Projections on the world food markets have been routinely conducted by researchers and major international and national agencies for predicting food security situation and changing consumption patterns. Various quantitative economic tools have been applied, among which are the computable general equilibrium models. For purposes of capturing the inter-sectoral linkages through the goods and factors markets, such as those between the livestock sectors and the grain sectors, and of consistently tracking utility-maximizing consumers' changing consumption patterns due to income growth, a general equilibrium model is most desirable for this study. Moreover, the focus of the projection exercise on changing trade patterns also mandates a model with explicit trade linkages. For these reasons, the GTAP model (Hertel 1997) , a widely used model in analyzing global trade issues, is adopted in this paper. Similar applications based on the GTAP model on projecting food demand, supply, and trade include: Anderson et al. (1997) , Bach et al. (2000) , Rae et al. (2000), Nin et al. (2004) , Yu et al. (2004) and Anderson et al. (2013) , to just name a few. The projection contained in this section is based on the most recent GTAP version 9 database which has 2011 as its base year. To limit the computation burden and for ease of analyzing the results, the GTAP database is aggregated into 18 countries or regions and 21 sectors, of which 13 are agricultural, livestock product and food sectors. In particular, we include wheat, rice, maize (and other coarse grains), oil seeds including soybeans, cattle meats (including beef and mutton), and other meats (mainly pig meats and poultry meats) as individual sectors/products in this aggregated database.
In projecting China's future meat trade patterns, several important drivers should be considered, ranging from per capita income growth, population and demographic changes, factors that impact production costs, development in related products especially feed grains, as well as domestic and trade policies. Among these drivers, per capita income growth and population changes are the most emphasized ones in similar projections (see e.g. Anderson et al. 2013) . The main assumptions used in the current paper are sourced from the baseline maintained by CEPII (Fouré et al. 2012, and Fouré 2013) and are detailed in a related study by Yu (2014) . The most significant assumption is China's GDP growth rate at 236.5% during the 2011-2030 period, whereas its population is expected to grow at single digit (6.3%) during the same period. In addition, skilled labor force is projected to grow by 66.4% whereas unskilled labor is to shrink by 7.2%. In order to reach the projected GDP growth rate, both capital stocks and total factor productivity are allowed to adjust endogenously in the model. Similarly, macroeconomic shocks to other countries/regions are included in the projection. Table 9 reports the main results from the projection scenario for meats, dairy, and grains. For comparison purposes, we also list the results from an alternative scenario where quantities of meat imports are fixed as the base case level of 2011. This scenario is simulated by endogenizing China's import tariffs on meat products while fixing the quantity of meat imports.
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As compared to the base case of 2011, China's cattle meats and other meat outputs are expected to increase by respectively 75% and 88%, exceeding the projected increases of grain outputs (Table 9) . This is largely due to higher income elasticities of demand for meat products as compared to those of grains. Similar output increases are also projected to milk and dairy products. While outputs are projected to grow significantly for meat products, the projected increases still lag behind the projected demand expansion (at about 90%) fueled by the assumed income growth. As such, dramatic increases in meat imports are expected, leading to reduced meat self-sufficiency ratios for both cattle and other meats (from respectively 94.8% and 99.7% in 2011 to 87.7% and 93.4% in 2030) and increased shares of world meat imports (from 4% and 5.2% in 2011 to 14% and 31.7% in 2030 for cattle and other meats, respectively).
The projected increases in China's meat import shares appear to be particularly large and deserve some further discussion in relation to its impact on the grain markets. To sustain the large increase in meat demand induced by income growth, feed grain imports also have to rise. Indeed in the projection, maize, soybean (oilseeds) and wheat imports are expected to increase by 104, 87, and 199 percent, respectively. In the case of soybean, China's share of total world imports will approach 50%. As a result, self-sufficiency ratios continue to deteriorate for these three products, especially for soybean (decreasing from 38.8% to 28.2%). Domestically, feed demand for domestically produced grains is also expected to rise, leading to generally larger increases in their outputs, as compared to the projected increase in food demand for grains. However, soybean remains an exception as its growing domestic demand is projected to be met by imports.
In the alternative scenario where meat imports are restricted to the levels of 2011 7 , simulation results indicate that rising meat demand will have to be met with large increases in domestic meat production. In that case, China will have to further increase imports of feed grains, leading to even lower self-sufficiency ratios in these products.
From this preliminary projection exercise, it appears that demand-driven forces will likely push China's meat demand beyond its supply capacities in the future, should current production practice and trade policies remain unchanged. In the case where China decides to curb the expected import surge of meat products, increasing feed grain imports will be resulted.
Conclusions and discussions
Earlier projections on rising meat demand in China due to per capita income growth have shown up in China's domestic statistics on meat demand and outputs; however, these projections have so far not been translated into larger quantities of meat imports. During the 2000-12 period, China has only consistently imported poultry meats and meat offal on a yearly basis but even in these products China's imports have been a tiny fraction of its domestic demand. The main purpose of this paper is therefore to provide a descriptive analysis on China's meat trade patterns, in reference to its grain trade patterns, for purposes of 7 As shown in Table 7 , China's MFN tariff rates for meat products are between 15 and 20 percent. These tariff barriers are not likely to act as effective restrictions on future imports, when future domestic/world market price gaps reverses in favor of lower world market prices.
In that case, NTMs such as SPS and TBT measures based on legitimate consumer health concerns and sounded scientific evidence (as required by relevant WTO rules) might become the more likely policy instruments, should China choose to restrict meat imports while allowing for increased grain imports.
understanding China's hitherto low profile on the world meat markets. 8 Evidence seems to suggest that one of the main reasons behind China's seemingly paradoxical meat trade pattern is its ability to secure large amount of feed grain imports from the world market, especially with regard to the imports of soybean and also maize. In the case of soybean and soybean based products, China's imports have been nearly half of the total world trade in recent years.
Aside from the reliance on imported feed grains, several other observations also help to explain China's small meat imports. First, China's domestic prices for meat products (except poultry) have been lower than the relevant benchmark world market prices, possibly reflecting the relatively lower production costs. However, such gaps have been narrowed significantly in the more recent years, perhaps due to rising production costs and currency appreciations. Second, China still maintained some tariff barriers for meat imports, which are generally higher than the tariff rates applied to within-quota grain imports. These tariffs likely acted as a second buffer to shield China's meat market from increasing meat imports. Lastly, China also maintains some non-tariff measures, mainly through SPS regulations. However, our limited exposure to the functioning of the latter measures cannot yet offer any substantive insights as to their restrictiveness on China's meat imports.
Are earlier projections on China's meat imports entirely wrong? Based on the current analysis, this does not appear to be the case, especially considering the shrink price gaps between China's domestic market and the world market and the perspectives on continuing rapid economic growth in China. In addition, animal diseases, food safety concerns, and environmental damages arisen from intensive livestock production, are all likely to augment rising production costs in constraining expansion of domestic meat production. Indeed, in the near future China may not be able to maintain such a lower profile on the world meat markets, as per capita income is projected to continue to rise and domestic production cost advantages erode due to rising labor costs. A model based projection exercise indicates that under plausible assumptions China's meat imports may rise to nearly one-third of the world market by 2030, if no further tariff barriers or restrictive NTMs are introduced. Should China wish to resist this expected import surge, new trade policy options are likely to be limited to non-tariff measures. In regards to the linkages between meats and grain imports, the scenario of restricted meat imports will have to be accompanied by even higher feed grain imports.
Two caveats on the current analysis should be noted. In our attempt to understand China's apparently low level of meat imports, evidence on price and cost advantages is gathered. However, due to space limitations no efforts have been made in this study to explain this evidence. Readers are therefore referred to the relevant literature (e.g. Rae 2008 , Waldron et al. 2007 , and Nin et al. 2004 ) on productivity progress in China's livestock sectors as well as on the more general "livestock revolution" taken place in China. It should also be noted that projections presented in this paper addresses China's meat supply and trade prospects from a rather "static" sense, without explicitly considering potential productivity growth, innovations and organizations of China's livestock sector, and current and future policy actions aiming at supporting the livestock sectors. As such, there are considerable uncertainties on the future outcomes vis-à-vis the preliminary projections presented in the last section of the paper. Total  Quantity (1000 tons)  2000  136  6  18  850  134  1145  53  17  4  405  36  514  83  -11  14  446  99  630  2001  94  4  25  707  143  974  103  21  3  403  41  571  -9  -17  22  304  103  403  2002  145  11  35  574  115  880  162  12  5  328  17  524  -17  -1  30  246  98  356  2003  149  8  34  644  213  1048  213  9  12  276  11  522  -64  -1  22  368  201  526  2004  71  3  33  185  246  538  291  16  24  119  16 
